Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes

Author: Jong Hwa Lee

ABSTRACT
I analyze the two-group contest with the group-specific public-goods prize when each player decides on the timing of their moves endogenously and individually. Unlike the previous papers, I show that free riders suffer a damage in the endogenous-timing framework because the decision on the endogenous timing adversely affects the behavior of free riders, by making them more egotistical.

Source:

Journal: Theoretical Economics Letters
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.76112 (PDF)
Paper Id: 79422 (metadata)

See also: Comments to Paper

About scirp

(SCIRP: http://www.scirp.org) is an academic publisher of open access journals. It also publishes academic books and conference proceedings. SCIRP currently has more than 200 open access journals in the areas of science, technology and medicine. Readers can download papers for free and enjoy reuse rights based on a Creative Commons license. Authors hold copyright with no restrictions. SCIRP calculates different metrics on article and journal level. Citations of published papers are shown based on Google Scholar and CrossRef. Most of our journals have been indexed by several world class databases. All papers are archived by PORTICO to guarantee their availability for centuries to come.
This entry was posted in TEL. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *